William K. Howard et al v. Mildred M. Howard et al : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1961
William K. Howard et al v. Mildred M. Howard et al
: Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Backman, Backman & Clark; Attorneys for Appellant;
Perris S. Jensen; Attorney for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Howard v. Howard, No. 9552 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3925
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM l~. HOWARD, RUTH N. 
HOWARD, ROBE.RT D. HOWARD, 
and SfiiRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
\ r- 0 ~IJLDRJi}D ~L~v~~ARD, F \ L l: .. , i 
Defendant and Appellant. t' \ V - 8 YJb 
~IILDRED i\1. H0\\7ARD, _____ -·------ ,.. _-··~·-u1~t;·~ 
Defendant and 11h~ird-l~(tiTfjc-;': Su7){tifsfJ'~h. 
Plaint iff and A]J ]JP!l aut. 9552 
-vs.-
\V"ALI(ER BANK&, Tl1l~HT C~()~l­
PANY, as Adnlinistrator of the Pstate 
of L. \r. HOvVARD, deceased, 'YIL-
LLA~l 1{:. l-10.\\'"ARD, I-{ lT T ll X. 
HOW~\l<D, ROB11JRT D. HO\Y.ARD 
:tnd ~l-IIRLEY l__J. IIO\rARD, 
Third -I) a r fy Defe or! rt 11 t ...... , 
and Respondents. 
BRIE 1~ ()F, RI~~SPOXD I~~xrrN 
.A. ppeal fron1 rrhird Distrirt C~onrt 
in and for Ralt 1 ~ake County 
Ho~. _..-\. H. ELLETT, Presidiu.rJ ,Jud.f/P 
BACI~:\lAN, BACIZ~[AN 
& CLARK 
Attorneys for ... -lppellaut 
Deseret Bldg., Salt Lake City, l ... tah 
PERRIS S. Jl~Xf-;EX 
.. Attorney for Respo11rlenfs 
,, ... alker Bank Bldg., 
~alt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Statement of the Case, Disposition of Case by Lower Court, 
Statement of Facts, and Relief Sought by Appellant._______ 1 
Statement of Respondents' Points------------------------·-·······-·············· 2 
Argument ______ . __ ...... ___ ............ ____________________ . ____ -·····-·· _________ . _ ____ __ _ _ __ __ ___ 3 
Point 1. Decedent intended to do what he did do, to-wit: 
deliberately execute a void deed. ------------------------ 3 
Point 2. If decedent intended to execute a deed it was 
with testamentary intent and was not intended 
as a present conveyance of a present interest.______ 4 
Point 3. Said deed, as a testamentary disposition of 
estate, is not susceptible to reformation.____________ 5 
Point 4. Intent to make a gift is not sufficient if the gift 
is not actually consummated during the lifetime 
of the donor. -------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
Point 5. Equity 'viii not reform a gift deed when to do so 
will cause gross injustice such as disinheriting 
the natural heirs of the donor. ---------------------------- 7 
Point 6. The deed is void because it does not close and 
shows no intent to close because it does not go 
back to the place of beginning. (Argued with 
point 7.) _ --------- _________________ .. __________ . ___ . __ _________ _____ _ _ _ ___ _ _ 13 
Point 7. The deed is also fatally defective in that it con-
tains an irreconcilable ambiguity. ------------------------ 13 
Point 8. Extrinsic evidence may not be resorted to to 
reform a deed containing a patent defect unless 
something in the deed furnishes the key to re-
solving the ambiguity. ------------------------------------------ 19 
Point 9. Attempted conveyance of a specific portion of a 
larger tract is void for uncertainty if the por-
tion is not specifically defined. ------------------------------ 26 
Conc'l UBi on __ ... ___ ......... ____ ----. __ ---........... ----------.. ------------------------------------ 32 
I. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(C·ontinued) 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Baldwin v. Hinton, 90 SE2 316 ---------------------------------------------------··· 20 
Best v. Wohlford, 144 Cal. 737, 78 P. 294 .................................... 20 
Blume v. MacGregor, 148 P2 656 .................................................. 25 
Brose v. Boise City, 5 Idaho 695' .................................................... 15 
Carson v. Palmer, 190 S 720, 722.................................................... 17 
Carter & Bro. v. Ewers, 131 SW2 86.......................................... 17 
Deal v. Cooper, 94 NW 62 ................................................................ 31 
Dowding v. Dowding, 152 Neb. 61, 40 NW2 245 ........................ 10 
Edwards v. City of Santa Paula, 292 P2 31, 35 ...................... 16, 20 
Hazlitt v. Bryan, 192 Tenn. 251, 241 SW2 121 ........................ 10 
Launderville v. Mero, 281 P 7 49, 69 ALR 416............................ 11 
Losee v. Jones, 120 U 385, 235 P2 132, 137 .................................... 22 
Lytle v. Hulen, 128 Ore 483, 275 P 45, 114 ALR 596................ 8 
National Cylinder Gas Co. v. Paekwood Mfg. Co., 208 SW2 
825 -· ... -.. ------------.... ---.---·-------.--.-.. -.---. --- -·----------..... -.---.-... ------- -·--- 26 
North Carolina Self Help Co. v. Brinkley, 215 NC 615, 2 
SE2 88 9, 8 92 -·---- ........................ _______ .. ------------- .. -----------------....... 20 
Park v. Wilkinson, 21 U 279, 60 P 945', 946 ................................ 23 
Peel v. Calais, 26 SE2 916 .............................................................. 28 
Peel v. Calais, 31 SE2 440 ········--------·-·········-·--······--------------····--····· 29 
Powers v. Rude, 79 P 89, 14 Okla 381. ....................... -----------·····---- 21 
Ransberry v. Broadheads, 174 A 97 ................. --------------------------··· 24 
Shiver v. Young, 144 SE 129, 38 Ga App 409 .... ------------------·········· 20 
Stanley v. Stanley, 94 P2 465, 97 U 250 ... ·-------------------··--···---······- 5 
Stewart v. Cary, 220 NC 214, 17 SE2 29, 144 ALR 1287 ............ 21 
Strout v. Burgess, 112 ALR2 939, 144 Me 263, 68 A 241.......... 7 
Wharton v. Garvin, 34 Pa 340 ........................................................ 24 
II. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
A.L.R. Vol. 68, p. 12 ........................ ------------------------------------------------ 16 
A.L.R. Vol. 69, p. 419........................................................................ 8 
A.L.R. Vol. 69, p. 427 ........................................................................ 11 
A.L.R. Vol. 69, p. 428........................................................................ 12 
A.L.R. Vol. 117, p. 1073 .................... -------·---------------·--------------------···· 30 
Am. J ur. Vol. 16, 587 n 1 !............................................................ 29 
Am. J ur. Vol. 16, p. 588.................................................................... 30 
C.J.S. Vol. 11, Sec. 47, n 9, p. 597 .................................................. 14 
C.J.S. Vol. 26, p. 646-647 .................................................................. 19 
C.J .S. Vol 38, p. 793........................................................................ 7 
C.J.S. Vol. 38, p. 798 ........................................................................ 7 
Patton on Titles, p. 219, n 125 ........................................................ 30 
Patton ~n Titles, p. 265, Sec. 7 4.................................................... 24 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (3rd Edn) Vol. 2, Sec. 588, 
p. 958 .................................................................................. ----.. . . 9 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (3rd Edn) Vol. 6, Sec. 679, 
p 1144 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·--- 8 
Story's Equity Jurisprudence (14th Edn) Vol. 2, Sec. 982........ 8 
Tiffany Real Prop. ( 3rd Edn) Vol. 4, p. 80................................ 9 
III. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N. 
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HO\V ARD, 
and SI-IIRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
1\fiLDRED M. HOWARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MILDRED M. HOWARD, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
W ALI(ER BANK & TRUST COM-
PANY, as Administrator of the estate 
of L. \V. HOWARD, deceased, WIL-
LIA~f l(. HOWARD, RUT H N. 
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD 
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
and Respo-ndents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
9552 
Respondents agree with Appellant's Statement of 
the Case, Disposition of the Case by the Lower Court, 
the Statement of Facts, and that the relief sought by 
appellant is correctly set forth in her Statement of Relief 
Sought on Appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON BY 
RESPONDENTS 
POINT 1. 
DECEDENT INTENDED TO DO WHAT HE DID DO, 
TO-WIT: DELIBERATELY EXECUTE A VOID DEED. 
POINT 2. 
IF DECEDENT INTENDED TO EXECUTE A DEED IT 
WAS WITH TESTAME.NTARY INTENT AND WAS NOT IN-
TENDED AS A PRESENT CONVEYANCE OF A PRESENT 
INTEREST. 
POINT 3. 
SAID DEED, AS.~ TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF 
ESTATE, IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO REFORMATION. 
POINT 4. 
INTENT TO MAKE A GIFT IS NO·T. SUFFICIENT IF 
THE GIFT IS NOT ACTUALLY CONSUMMATED DURING 
THE LIFETIME OF THE DONOR. 
POINT 5 .. 
EQUITY WILL NO·T REFORM A GIFT DEED WHEN TO 
DO SO WILL CAUSE GROSS INJUSTICE SUCH AS DIS-
INHERITING THE NATURAL HEIRS OF THE DONOR. 
POINT 6.-
THE DEED IS VOID BECAUSE. IT DOES NOT CLOSE 
AND SHO·WS NO INTE-NT TO CLOSE BECAUSE IT DOES 
NOT GO BACK TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
POINT 7. 
THE DEED IS .ALSO FATALLY DEFECTIVE IN THAT 
IT CONTAINS AN IRRECONCILABLE AMBIGUITY. 
POINT 8. 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE RESORTED TO 
TO REFORM A DEED CONTAINING A PATENT DEFECT 
UNLESS SOMETHING IN THE DEED FURNISHES THE 
KEY TO RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY. 
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POINT 9. 
ATTEMPTED CONVEYANCE OF A SPECIFIC PORTION 
OF A LARGER 'TRACT IS VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY IF 
THE PORTION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DEFINED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
DECEDENT INTENDED 'TO DO WHAT HE DID DO, 
TO-WIT: DELIBERATELY EXECUTE A VOID DEED. 
Lucas William Howard, the grantor in the deed 
which is the subject of this action, is not with us to clarify 
his intent. His intent can only be determined from what 
he did. T·he appellant blithely determines this "intent" to 
suit herself. Throughout her brief there are many s~ate­
ments such as "it is clearly shown that he intended," "the 
grantor was intending," ''it is evident he intended,'' "he 
thought he had," etc. An analysis of the instrument does 
not show any such intention as ap·pellant claims. 
It is the firm belief of respondents that their father 
intended to do exactly what he did do, viz., make a void 
deed. Why would he do this~ Simply to satisfy his wife 
and lead her to believe that she had succeeded in obtaining 
her husband's entire estate, or virtually all of it, thereby 
depriving her step-children of any share in their father's 
estate. The decedent did what he did in order that he 
might have a little p·eace at home during his declining 
years. With the lmowledge that the deed was void he 
could keep his wif~ satisfied and yet feel assured that 
his children, the issue of his "first love" would partici-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
pate, at least to an extent, in his estate. His wife, the 
step-mother of respondents, had already extracted from 
him, by means of joint tenancy, a fortune vastly in excess 
of anything she would require during her remaining life-
time. Had it been the decedent's intent to give her all, that 
could likewise have been readily accomplished by placing 
the property in question likewise in joint tenancy. But 
that he did not do. He was able, by executing a deed, 
knowingly incomplete, to both satisfy his wife and assure 
something over for his children. 
That this was his intent is further evidenced by the 
fact that two years after executing this deed, he, appar-
ently having in mind the invalidity of this deed, made 
another deed to his wife, specifically describing the home, 
the property thus later conveyed being a portion of the 
tract partially described in the first deed. 
POINT 2. 
IF DECEDENT INTENDED TO EXECUTE A DEED IT 
WAS WITH TESTAMENTARY INTENT AND WAS NOT IN-
TENDED AS A PRESENT CONVEYANCE OF A PRESENT 
INTEREST. 
That the purported deed was in reality intended as a 
testamentary disposition and not as a present gift of a 
present interest is evidence by Appellant's Brief. On 
page 3 of her brief appellant states : "The deed was de-
livered to appellant with instructions to place the same 
of record in the office of the County Recorder of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, upon the death of L .W. Howard." 
L. W. Howard, the grantor, died Nov. 30, 1955. (App. 
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Brief pg 2) The deed was recorded next day, Dec. 1, 
1955. (App. Brief pg. 3.) 
That said deed was intended to be testamentary only, 
and \Vas not intended to convey a present interest at the 
tin1e of execution, is further evidenced by the fact that 
on ~1:ay 13, 1947, the decedent made another deed to his 
wife, describing a portion of the property described in 
the first (testamentary) deed 'vhich \vas already in exist-
ence. (See App. Brief, pgs 3-4.) If the first deed was 
intended to be other than testamentary, why rlid he exe-
cute the second deed' 
The question of law here involved has already been 
ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court in Stanley v. 
Stanley, 94 P2 465, 97 U 250, the syllabus of which reads 
as follo,vs : 
''In quiet title action involving question 
whether testator had delivered deed to widow 
with i'ntent f;o presently pas.s title, evidence sus-
tained trial court's finding that deed had not been 
delivered with such intent even if widow had been 
permitted to testify as to the manual delivery of 
the deed." 
POINT 3. 
SAID DEED, AS A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF 
ESTATE, IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO REFORMATION. 
Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, \T ol. 1, Chap. 8, 
page 333, Sec. 167 cites the rule: 
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"Where the will as drawn and executed varies 
from testators instructions and actual wishes, dis-
appointed legatees and devisees have frequently 
invoked the jurisdiction of equity to grant re-
formation, or some relief analagous thereto. 
Equity has regularly refused to grant reforma-
tion." (Emphasis added.) 
Numerous cases, from 16 states, are cited in support of 
this rule, including new cases cited in the pocket parts. 
Continuing, in the same section, discussing the mat-
ters which equity will not reform, Page, on page 335, 
states further : 
''For some or all of these reasons equity will 
not grant reformation in case of misdescription 
of realty devised, (note 7) or an omission of part 
of the realty which testator meant to devise. (note 
8)." 
Further: 
"It has been said that a court of equity has no 
jurisdiction to reform a will and that if such a 
court enters a decree of reformation, such decree 
may be attacked collaterally (note 12)." 
POINT 4. 
INTENT TO MAKE A GIFT IS NOT SUFFICIENT IF 
THE GIFT IS NOT ACTUALLY CONSUMMATED DURING 
THE LIFETIME OF THE DONOR. 
C.J.S. cites the following rule on gifts: 
"To be effective, a gift must go into immedi-
ate and present effect. A 1nere intention to make 
a gift, however clearly expressed, 'vhich has not 
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been carried into effect amounts to nothing, and 
confers no rights in the subject matter of the pro-
posed gift on the intended donee." 38 CJS 793. 
Further: 
"In any event, a delivery to be sufficient to 
support a gift must be absolute and unqualified; 
it must transfer possession to the donee, and vest 
in him a present and irrevocable title; it must vest 
the donee with and divest the donor of control and 
dominion over the property.'' 38 CJS 798. 
That the gift to respondents' step-mother was not 
consummated is evidenced by appellant's request to the 
court to reform the deed. No title-examiner would 
pass a title resting on an ambiguous deed, containing a 
description which did not purport to close. Regardless 
of decedent's intent the fact remains that he did not make 
a valid conveyance, sufficient to pass title, without re-
formation of the deed. 
The court could be certain as to the intent of the 
grantor, and yet if the grantor did not carry that intent 
into effect the court would be powerless to consummate 
the gift. 
"Intent alone is not sufficient to create rights, 
but the intent must be carried into effect by acts 
which are legally sufficient to accomplish the in-
tended purpose." Strout v. Burgess, 112 ALR2 
939, 144 Me. 263, 68 A2 241. 
POINT 5. 
EQUITY WILL NOT REFORM A GIFT DEED WHEN TO 
DO SO WILL CAUSE GROSS INJUSTICE SUCH AS DIS-
INHERITING THE NATURAL HEIRS OF THE DONOR. 
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On page 21 of her brief appellant cites two cases as 
authority for the statement that equity will reform a 
description in favor of a donee in a deed of gift. This is 
the rule only in exceptional cases, but it is not the general 
rule. These two cases will be later discussed, but first 
let us set forth the general rule. It is stated by A.L.R. as 
follows: 
''Courts will not reform purely voluntary con-
veyances. " 69 A.L.R. 419. 
In Lytle v. Hulen, 128 Ore. 483, 275 P.45, 114 ALR 
596 the court quotes with approval, the rule as set forth 
in Story's Equity Jurisprudence. The court said: 
"The rule is stated in 2 Story's Equity Juris-
prudence (14th Edn) Sec. 982, thus: 'The right 
to correct ;J,nd reform a written instrument exe-
cuted by mistake or fraud is one that attaches pri-
marily to conveyances to which the injured party 
stands as a bona fide purchaser for value and 
does not apply, as a general rule, \\7here the con-
veyance is the evidence of the bounty of the grant-
or, and a mere gratuity as to the grantee. The 
grantor, if living, could not be compelled to cor-
rect the deed; and in the absence of consent of all 
the parties equity will not grant the relief." 
This case has been cited with approval in the following 
later cases: 3 P2 7rl3, 35 P2 250; 40 P2 1015; 73 F2 570; 
93 F2 788; 22 S2 226; 12 SE2 210; 6 SE2 26; 29 SE2 
67 4; 56 SE2 342. 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Third Edition, 
Vol. 6, page 1144, Sec. 679 sets forth the rule: 
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"No relief will be awarded to a grantee in an 
imperfect conveyance which is not supported by 
either a valuable or meritorious consideration 
against either the grantor or his representatives." 
This is supported by quotations from sixteen cases. The 
reason for the rule, and the justice of the rule is explained 
by Pomeroy in Vol. 2 of Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 
Third Edition, Sec. 588, page 958, as follows: 
"All agreements, so far as the binding effi-
cacy of their promises is concerned, must be re-
ferred to one or the other of three causes, - a 
valuable consideration, a mere voluntary bounty, 
or the performance of a moral duty. The first 
alone is binding at law, and enables the promisee 
to enforce the obligation against the promisor. 
The second, while the promise is executory, is a 
mere nullity, both at law and equity. The third 
constitutes the meritorious or imperfect considera-
tion of equity and is recognized as effective by it 
within very narrow limits, although not at all by 
the law." 
It will be observed that the gift to the appellant falls 
1n the second classification, \vhich Pomeroy calls "A 
mere nullity, both at law and equity. 
Tiffany, Third Edition, Vol. 4, page 80, declares the 
rule to be: 
"According to the weight of authority it (re-
formation) will not be given as against the heirs 
or devisees of a deceased donor by reason of the 
failure of the language of the conveyance to ex-
press the donor's probable intention." 
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Ten cases are cited in support of this rule. It would un-
duly increase this already large brief if the various cases 
establishing this rule were individually quoted from and 
discussed. The justice of the rule is obvious. Where 
the authorities unanimously state the general rule anal-
ysis of the individual cases is only cumulative. It is, how-
ever in order, for respondent to comment on the two 
cases cited by appellant. 
Appellant first cites the case of Hazlitt v. Bryan, 
192 Tenn. 251, 241 SW2 121. In this case the court mere-
ly discusses the 1natter of jurisdiction of the equity 
court and does not give enough facts from which the 
rights of the litigants might be ascertained, but it does 
quote 'vith approval, and as authority for its ruling, 
Dowd.ing v. Dowding, 152 Neb. 61, 40 NW2 245, as 
follows: 
"If there is equity in plaintiff's case as 
against the rights asserted by the defendants a 
reformation should be decreed. If plaintiff's case 
is lacking ,in the elements that go to move the 
conscience of a court of equity, relief should be 
denied on that ground, but not for want of juris-
diction in the court because of the voluntary na-
ture of the conveyance." 
Obviously the Do\\~ding case came under the third classi-
fication outlined by Pomeroy hereinabove, "the perforin-
ance of a moral duty," and likely, if the facts were 
known, the Hazlitt case 'vould also fall into that classifi-
cation. 
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Let us briefly refer to the equities in this case. If 
defendant prevails she will receive from the estate of 
Lucas W. Howard not only all of the joint tenancy prop-
erty, \\'"hich 'vas a fortune in itself, including a bank ac-
count in excess of $15,000.00, and not only the statutory 
one-third which the Utah law considers to be her right-
ful share of the estate. In addition to these she \Yill re-
ceive, for herself, n.lone, to the exclusion of the children, 
a tract appraised at $84,000.00 all of \vhich was owned by 
decedent long prior to his marriage to appellant. The 
inventory in the estate lists assets in the sum of $117,-
690.00 exclusive of joint tenancy property. Of this $117,-
690.00 the appellant claims as her own all but $17,060.00. 
(a) If the deed is reformed appellant will 
receive this $100,000.00, plus one third of the re-
mainder, and the balance, if there is any balance 
at all after paying from this remainder, the taxes, 
costs of administration, etc., will be divided among 
the children. 
(b) If the deed is rejected as invalid ap-
pellant will receive, in addition to the joint ten-
ancy property, one-third of the whole estate, and 
the children will divide the balance. 
Does this justify equity in using its extraordinary 
po,vers to make a gift, where it is not even clear that a 
gift was intended' 
The other case cited by appellant, Launderville v. 
Mero, ~Iontana, 281 Pac. 749, 69 A.L.R. 416. ALR, in 
reporting this case, at page 427 shows that this case is 
contrary to the general rule, which is stated as follows: 
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''The weight of authority supports the view 
that the grantee is not entitled to a reformation 
of a voluntary conveyance made without any 
consideration, as against the heirs of the grantor 
after the latter's death." 
Particularly is this the case where the grantee is also 
an heir. Page 428 of 69 A.L.R. states: 
"According to the weight of authority, equity 
will not reform a voluntary conveyance not sup-
ported by any consideration, at the suit of the 
grantee, who is an heir of the grantor, as against 
the other heirs of the deceased grantor." 
It is not considered helpful here to further prolong this 
brief by quoting the cases relied upon and cited by A.L.R. 
There are exceptions to this rule, as in the case cited by 
defendant at 69 A.L.R. 416 (Launderville v. 1l! ero, supra) 
where the other heirs are provided for, and where the 
deed to be reforJJ~ed is one of a group or series; but that 
is not the case in the action now before the court, and 
equity and justice combine to de1nand that the general 
rule be followed and the children be allo,Yed to inherit 
their rightful estate. 
Because appellant seeks to lend 'veight to the Laun-
derville case, by tying it to the footnotes of the l:tah code, 
brief 1nention of that case is in order. In the Launderville 
case the grantor deeded all of his lands to his three 
daughters. All \Yent into possession of their respective 
tracts. The grantor testified "he didn't have an acre to 
his nan1e," after the conveyances "~ere 1nade. After his 
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death it was discovered that one of the deeds 'vas defec-
tive. The court properly amended it to give effect to the 
series of deeds, and to do equity between the sisters. With 
that law, as it applied to that case, respondent's have 
no quarrel. It is another of the type of cases referred to 
by Pomeroy, where there is "a moral duty." No such 
equities exist in the case now before the court. 
POINT 6. 
THE DEED IS VOID BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CLOSE 
AND SHO·WS NO INTENT TO CLOSE BECAUSE IT DOES 
NOT GO BACK TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
POINT 7. 
THE DEED IS ALSO FATALLY DEFECTIVE IN THAT 
IT CONTAINS AN IRRECONCILABLE AMBIGUITY. 
Points 6 and 7 both pertain to the description in the 
deed. In order to avoid duplication it is deemed advisable 
to discuss both together, and at the same time to point 
out the weaknesses of appellants arguments in the five 
points relied upon by her, all of which pertain to the 
description in the deed. 
To make out a valid description appellant would 
have the court discard entirely three courses, as "super-
fluous," extend another course to reach the ''intended" 
corner, and then supply a course entirely missing, to 
bring the description back to the starting point and make 
it enclose something. This is an effort to create some-
thing out of nothing. There are many cases in the records 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
where the courts have supplied a missing part, or cor-
rected an incorrect course or distance; but nowhere, at 
any time, have the courts so completely reconstruted an 
instrument as appellants now ask. 
First of all, may the courts discard the portion of 
the description which reads: "to a point which is South 
55°30' W 455 ft thence S 46°25' E 154 ft thence S 
43°35' West 160 feet more or less from beginning"~ 
Such course, if traced back from the point of beginning, 
would bring one fairly close to the northwest corner of 
what appellant calls the west jog. Rather than discard 
this portion of the description the decisions of the court 
are to the effect that this portion of the description would 
take precedence over the other courses. The three 
courses, which appellant would have the court discard, 
fix a definite point to which the other direction and dis-
tance must yield. A line going to a definite fixed point 
goes to that point and direction and distance must yield 
to this fixed point. Such a point is called a locative call 
and takes precedence over a directory or descriptive 
call. See 11 CJS Sec. 47, n. 9, page 597, and numerous 
cases there cited. 
Appellant would have us believe that when decedent 
wrote "from beginning" he thought he had described 
"to the place of beginning." Respondents cannot believe 
that their father was so ignorant that he did not lmow the 
difference between "to" and "from." When he wrote 
"from beginning" he certainly did not believe that he 
was writing "to beginning." 
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Respondents have no quarrel with the law cited by 
appellant in her argument of her Point II, but the appli-
cation of the law cited to the facts now before the court 
does not help appellant's position. 
The reference to Brose v. Boise City RR, 5 Idaho 695 
is ludicrous. How can appellant seriously assert that the 
Ho,vard description after discarding the locative calls 
"is otherwise complete and accurate"~ Or can she assert 
that this deed ''contains two descriptions, one of which 
describes the land with reasonable certainty''~ Is this 
description made any more reasonable and certain by 
discarding the locative calls than it would be by discard-
ing any other courses~ Discard the claimed surplusage 
and what is left; only a shoestring, which encloses nothing 
and which shows no intent on the part of the grantor 
to enclose anything nor to return to the point of be-
. . ginning. 
Appellant in the lower court, and in her brief, claims 
that a surveyor could locate the description on the land. 
Respondents agree with the statement of the law that 
where that can be done the court may, under some cir-
cumstances, but not all, correct the description according-
ly. But surveyors are not magicians, and they can no 
more create something out of nothing than can the mem-
bers of the court. T·rue, a surveyor could lay out the 
north line, and the lines along Holladay Boulevard and 
Arbor Lane; but where does he go from there 1 Does he 
go X 46°25' W 404 feet, up through the middle of the 
tract, or does he go to the point definitely located by the 
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next three calls~ The surveyor has no power to follo'v the 
one and reject the other. Who is he to try to divine the 
mind of the decedent~ If the court cannot do it a sur-
veyor cannot do it. This is a patent ambiguity which ren-
ders the description absolutely void and not susceptible 
of correction. 
In 68 A.L.R. 12 there is an extensive compilation of 
cases from which the following rule is derived: 
"A patent ambiguity in the description of 
land in a deed or mortgage is such an uncertainty 
appearing on the face of the instrument that the 
court, reading the language in the light of all the 
facts and circumstances referred to in the instru-
ment, (emphasis added) is unable to derive there-
from the intention of the parties as to what land 
was to be conveyed. This type of ambiguity can-
not be removed by parol evidence (emphasis add-
ed) since that would necessitate inserting ne'Y 
language into the instrument, which under the 
parol evidence rule is not permitted." 
Referring to a patent ambiguity the California Su-
preme Court held, in Edu)(zrds v. Ci:ty of Santa Paula 
( 1956) 292 P2 31, 35 : 
"A description that is equally applicable to 
two different parcels is fatally defective." .. A .. uthor-
ities cited. 
In the case before the court it 'vould be possible, 
by discarding the locative calls, extending the "Testerly 
line, and adding a closing course or courses, to create 
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a description that would enclose a tract of land; but 
without doing any greater violence to the deed it would 
be just as feasible to discard as surplusage the course 
running N 46°:25' .,V 404 feet, and then add a fe,v courses, 
and thereby enclose a different tract of land; or by dis-
carding the third course, there by rnoving the "\vest line 
east"'ard by 6.15 ('hains, the tract would ahnost close; 
but actually 'vhere a patent ambiguity exists the court 
may do none of these things, because, in each case, it 
'vould be creating a description where none now exists. 
There are numerous cases in support of the foregoing 
statement of law. Only t"\\ro 'vill be referred to, by "\Vay 
of illustration. In Carson v. Palmer (Fla. 1939) 190 So. 
720, 722, the court held : 
~'A deed which on its face contains t"\vo in-
consistent descriptions, either of which would 
identify a different parcel of property from that 
described by the other, is void for uncertainty; 
provided there be not other language in the instnl-
ment "\Vhich sho"\vs the grantor's intent sufficiently 
for the court to determine which piece or parcel 
was intended to be conveyed." 
In W. T. Carter and Bro. v. Ewers, 131 SW2 86 the 
court states the rule : 
"The rule that a description in a deed that is 
uncertain may be made certain by the aid of ex-
trinsic evidence has no application in the present 
case, for the reason that the 'vords used by the 
grantors are themselves indeterminative, and 
there is no language in the deed 'vhich furnishes 
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a key whereby extrinsic evidence can make certain 
the extent of the interest purported to be con-
veyed." 
From the cases previously cited herein, and other 
such cases, it is obvious that the District Court did not 
err in declining to assign the case for trial, and in reject-
ing the proffered testimony of ~fr. Bush. Parol evidence 
not being admissible to clear a patent ambiguity, as above 
set forth, and Mr. Bush having no authority or ability 
to say what should be deleted and what should be added 
to the description in order to create a valid description, 
there was nothing to be accomplished by a trial. The 
court could rule upon the matter summarily, as a matter 
of law, as it did. It may very well be, as appellant con-
tends, that summary proceedings are not favored, but 
they do definitely have a place in the la,v, and are to be 
used by the court \vhere circumstances justify, and this 
is such a case. 
In the final portion of appellant's argument on her 
Point IV she raises a ne'v question. Devlin says that 
when a deed is uncertain reference may be made to prior 
deeds. Appellant says the deed by 'vhich L. "\\T. Howard 
took title may be referred to. Respondents cannot see 
how this can aid the court either to determine "~hether 
to cut up through the middle of the tract with the course 
running N 46°25' W, or whether to go around to the 
westerly corner of the jog and stop there. Would refer-
ence to the deed under 'vhich l\[r. Ho,vard acquired title 
clear the patent ambiguity created by a course running 
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'~ N 46°25' 'V" ~'to'' a point definitely located else,vhere 1 
No! 
POINT 8. 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE RESORTED TO 
TO REFORM A DEED CONTAINING A PATEN'T DEFECT 
UNLESS SOMETHING IN THE DEED FURNISHES THE 
KEY TO RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY. 
This point has already been touched upon in quota-
tions pertaining to points 6 and 7, supra. The rule, as 
set forth in 68 A.L.R. 12 is quoted on page 16 herein. The 
rule may also be found in CJS, where it is stated: 
"Although such extrinsic evidence must be 
sufficient to establish the identity of the land 
sought to be conveyed it must not ~add to, enlarge, 
or in any way change the description contained in 
the conveyance, and the writing itself must fur-
nish the hinge or hook on 'vhich to hang the aid 
thus afforded, without resorting to any secret 
or undisclosed intention of the parties thereto." 
26 CJS 646. 
Further: 
"If the deed contains inconsistent descrip-
tions, either of which is sufficient to identify dif-
ferent parcels of property, and there is nothing 
to show the grantor's intention, the deed is void 
for uncertainty." 26 CJS 647. 
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The reason for the foregoing rule is set forth in a 
Georgia case, Shiver v. Young, 144 SE 129, 38 GA App. 
409, as follows : 
"If the written description is altogether gen-
eral and does not point the 'vay for definition 
by extrinsic evidence, use of such evidence would 
be to add to and enlarge the terms of the written 
description, and not merely to clarify it." 
In Baldwim v. Hinton, 90 SE2 316 the court said: 
''The description must identify the land or it 
must refer to something that will identify it with 
certainty. Otherwise the description is void for 
uncertainty. Parol evidence is admissible to fit 
the description to this land. Such evidence cannot 
be used, however, to enlarge the scope of the de-
scriptive words. rfhe ~deed itself nttlSt poi,nt to the 
source from 'vhich evidence aluinde to make the 
deed complete is to be sought. North Carolina Self 
Help Co. v. Brinkley, 215 NC 615, 2 SE2 889, 
892.'' 
Edw.ards v. City of Santa Pa1tla, 292 P2 31 has been 
previously mentioned. A further quotation from that case 
will explain wherein extrinsic evidence may and may not 
be used. The court said : 
"Parol evidence is al,Yays admissible in aid of 
application of the description to its subject mat-
ter, but not for tlzc purpose of con1pleting a de-
scription which is inherently not susceptible of 
application to tli e ground. The distinction is illus-
trated in Best v. Wohlford, supra, 14-! Cal. at page 
737, 78 P at page 29-!: 'Parol evidence "Till not 
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be admitted to help out a defective description, 
or to sho"\v the intention with which it was made, 
or to resolve an ambiguity in its tern1s; but the 
rule that the description rnust be certain and defi-
nite and sufficient in itself to identify the land, 
does not exclude evidence for the purpose of 
applying the description to the surface of the 
earth, and thus identifying it with the tract in 
controversy. If a monument is given as the start-
ing point, evidence may be given to show its loca-
tion, but if the direction of the course from that 
monument is not given, evidence will not be re-
ceived to show what direction was intended. If the 
land is described by some name or designation, 
evidence 'vill be received for the purpose of show-
ing that the tract in controversy was well and 
generally known by that name or designation." 
Edu,ards v. City of Santa Paula, 292 P2 31, 34. 
The Oklahoma Supre1ne Court stated the rule: 
~'Equity will never receive parol evidence 
to both describe the land and then apply the de-
scription." Syllabus. Powers v. Rwde, 79 P. 89, 14 
Okla. 381. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held: 
"Where the language is patently ambiguous 
parol evidence is not admissible to aid the de-
scription.'' Stewart v. Cary, 220 N.C. 214; 17 SE 2 
29; 144 ALR 1287. 
Appellant, in her brief cites numerous cases where 
extrinsic evidence has been permitted in construction of 
a deed. It is not difficult to find such cases, but a careful 
examination thereof \vill sho\v that the evidence never 
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was admitted to create a description, but merely to ex-
plain something to which the deed itself makes reference, 
and which gives the key to the construction. 
Appellant cites Devlin and Deal v. Cooper, but in the 
case relied upon by Devlin the missing call could be 
supplied by rever~ing the calls, and in Deal v. Cooper, 
the deed afforded "sufficient data to. supply the omis-
sion." In each case it was a matter of construction of data 
in the deed, and not a rna tter of "destruction, extension, 
and creation" to create a description. 
Appellant next quotes voluminously from Losee v. 
Jones, 120 U. 385, 235 P2 132, 137. Respondents believe 
that an analysis of the Losee case will, rather than sup-
port appellants position, show that the District Court \Yas 
correct in ruling against the appellant. In the Losee case 
there was a positive delivery of the deeds, a \Yhole series 
of deeds, to a trustee, for delivery to the various grantees. 
One of the deeds in the series was defective, in that there 
was a slight gap. It did not close by perhaps 25 to 30 feet, 
but it did contain positive expression of intent to close, 
because it concluded "thence East 2.5 chains more or less 
to the place of beginning." This court held : 
''In the quoted phrase is expressed the in-
tention that the tract close by extending the final 
call to the place of beginning." 
No such intention appears in the Ho\Yard deed. The 
court, in the Losee case, held that 'vhere "the intent is 
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rnanifest and clear that the tract is to close, and the dis-
tance call is surh that this rnay be done \Yithout violating 
that call, \Ve conclude that it does close." In the How'"ard 
case there is neither intent to close, nor can it be made 
to close \vithout great violation to the call, nor can it be 
determined from what point closure should be com-
menced. The Losee case therefore by i1nplication, indi-
cates the Howard deed is not subject to closure. 
The court then, in the Losee case, quotes from the 
Park v. Wilkinson case, 21 l!tah 279, 60 P. 945, 946, in 
which case also a line \vas supplied. There was a missing 
course, but the next course followed up Canyon Creek, 
and the other courses then went on around, back to the 
point of beginning. All that the court added were the 
words, "more or less to the center of Canyon Creek'' 
thereby extending, slightly one course. 
The Losee case illustrates the point heretofore men-
tioned, that \vhen one of a series of deeds fails for \vant 
of a sufficient description the course will amend the in-
correct deed in order to effect justice and so that one heir 
will not be deprived of his estate \vhile the other heirs 
receive theirs because the other deeds in the series are 
correct. Again, this comes under the rule stated by 
Pomeroy, that reformation may be had in "performance 
of a moral duty." Where, as here, justice does not de-
mand reformation of the deed, then the general rule, as 
stated by Patton, and quoted in the Losee case, v~ill pre-
vail, to-wit : 
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"Even when the lines are continuous, they 
1nay fail to enclose any tract of land owing to 
failure of the final line to return to the starting 
point. Unless the description as stated, or as it 
may be allowably construed, can be made to close, 
the grant must fail." Losee v. Jones, supra, quot-
ing Patton on Titles, Sec. 7 4, pg 265. 
Reference is made by appellant to Ransberry v. 
Broadheads, 174 A 97 (Pa 1934) cited in Losee v. Jones, 
supra. There the place of beginning was a stone on the 
east bank of the creek. The end of the description was 
''thence crossing the creek * * * (sic) to a post on the east 
bank of said creek; thence do,vn the same * * * (sic) 
to the place of beginning." The court properly held 
that such a description meant that the east bank of the 
creek was to be the boundary line. The intent to close 
and the means of establishing the closing line are ap-
parent. 
The venerable Wharton v. Garvin case, 3± Pa 340 
(Pa. 1859) is next cited by appellant. Ilad appellant read 
through the Wharton case she "~ould not have relied 
thereon. There the "Test boundary "Tas the only boundary 
in question. The deed itself defined the 'Yest line as 
''North 35 degrees east 238 perches up along near said 
river to a post." One side contended this line ran along 
the river. The other side 1naintained it did not reach the 
river. Far from establishing or creating an arbirtrary 
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line the court held that the line must be placed exactly 
where the deed said it was, "near'' the river, and not 
''along" the river as the other side contended. The court 
said: "A call, to stand a~ a boundary, must be indicated 
to be such 'vith sufficient certainty to sho'v that it was so 
intended." 
The Blume v.ltlacGregor case cited by appellant falls 
into that class of cases where there is, on the face of the 
deed, such infonnation as will clear up the uncertainty. 
As appellant states the court held: ''In vie'v of the fact 
that this 1884 conveyance \vas expressed to be of 'a strip 
of land' and 'for the right of way of its (grantee's) rail-
road,' the missing courses and distances fairly suggest 
themselves on the face of the deed, bearing in mind the 
'vell known fact that railroad rights of \Vay are commonly 
strips of land of :1 uniform width." It is obvious that 
\vhere there is on the face of the deed, such informa6on 
that "the missing courses and distances fairly suggest 
themselves" the deed may be upheld; but this case can 
not be held to authorize a closing ",.hen the point from 
",.hich the closing should commence is itself uncertain. 
vVith the remainder of the quotations of generalla'v 
fron1 Bh11ne 1'. 1ll acGregor, respondents have no quarrel. 
They are correct statements of the law as applied to cer-
tain situations, but not as applied to the Howard deed-
except the last paragraph 'vhich "'"ill be dicussed under 
Point 9. 
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POINT 9. 
ATTEMPTED CONVEYANCE OF A SPECIFIC PORTION 
OF A LARGER TRACT IS VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY IF 
THE PORTION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DEFINED. 
Appellant states on page 18 of her brief, if the des~ 
cription is indefinite a statement of the quantity may help 
to locate the boundaries. Appellant states, "The grantor 
conveyed to defendant 2.75 acres more or less. In order 
to convey this acreage it is necessary to surround a tract 
of land. By supplying the last call grantor would have 
conveyed approximately the acreage called for by the 
deed." THIS STATEMENT IS WRONG AND MIS-
LEADING. T·he deed, if closed by ignoring the west jog, 
would cover approximately TvVICE 2.75 acres, and if 
the west jog is included it would cover 6.58 acres. 
If the grantor intended to convey anything, which 
respondents deny, then all he intended to convey was 2.75 
acres. The "more or less" cannot be held to permit twice 
the specified acreage to pass. More or less is limited to 
small quantities. In National Cyli1uler Gas Co. v. Pack-
wood Mfg. Co., 208 SW2 825 (~fo App.) the court held: 
''More or less is a term used to cover small 
errors of surveying apportionate to size of tract 
and in case of small city lot it cannot be construed 
to include 15.95 additional feet." 
If it should be conceded that L. W. Ho,vard intended 
to convey 2.75 acres the question is vVHAT 2.75 acres 1 
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An attempted conveyance of an undefined portion of a 
large tract is void for uncertainty, as 'viii be sho"rn by 
authorities hereinafter set forth. 
Simple arithmetic shows that appellant, by raising 
the question of acreage, puts her finger on still another 
fatal ambiguity in the deed. Even assuming, as appel-
lant so strenuously argues, that the last portion of the 
description should be discarded ; even assuming the 1nost 
favorable position appellant can claim, and \vhich she 
seeks to have the court establish, to-wit: running a 
straight line from the end of the fifth course to the place 
of begining, we would have left a description far in ex-
cess of 2.75 acres. Actually the square footage of the 
tract appellant proposes is 270,914.6 square feet. N O\V 
deduct from this the Temple and Woods description, 
160x150 feet or 24,000 square feet, and the theatre feet, 
or more than five acres. Which two and a half acres 
did he NOT INTEND to convey1 How can the court; 
how can anyone g,uess what he intended to convey ·and 
what he intended to retain. It simply cannot be done. Ap-
pellant, incidentally, cannot exclude the Continental Oil 
tract. That was not deeded until1951, six years after the 
execution of the deed 'vhich appellant seeks to refor1n. 
Now, if we add the west jog, the total acreage is 6.38 
acres, almost two and a half times the expressed 2.75 
acres. 
The courts cannot expand a man's generosity by 
construing a gift to cover more than he said it \vas to 
cover. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
Furthennore, when a grantor attempts to convey a 
portion of a larger tract, and unsuccessfully attempts to 
define the particular acreage to be conveyed, the recita-
tion of the acreage will not help. 
In Peel v. CalaiJs, 26 SE2 916 an effort was made to 
sustain a deed where the description did not return to 
the point of beginning. The last portion of the descrip-
tion read: 
"To a stake 300 feet from John Peel' line: 
thence with said line to the river, containing 22 
acres more or less." 
The court held such description to be void for uncertain-
ty. It said: 
"The call for the river is as the terminus of a 
line and not as a natural boundary. There is no 
language used sufficient to extend the line from 
that point so as to enclose locus in quo. Even if we 
concede that the general description adjoining the 
lands of John Peel, Griffin and others' is suffi-
cient, by resort to extrinsic evidence to supply 
the line from the original beginning point to the 
river on the western side of the land in contro-
versy, the fact still remains that there is no at-
tempt to close t lz e calls, (emphasis added) so as 
to embrace the land along the river. Hence the 
deed does not set forth any subject matter certain 
in itself." 
The sam·e case "~as again presented to the North 
Carolina Supreme Court, in an effort to n1ake the de-
scription good BEC~AI;SE OF THE REFEREN"CE TO 
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ACREAGE. At a later hearing, in Peel v. Calais, 31 SE2 
-140, the court rejected this eff or saying: 
~'While acreage may at times be material, it 
is not sufficient here to overcome the vagueness 
and uncertainty in other respects." 
Appellant, at page 19 of her brief, quotes from 
American Jurisprudence a general rule that a conveyance 
of a given number of acres out of a specified tract is not 
void for failure to locate the part conveyed. That, how-
ever, is not the situation in the Howard deed. There the 
attempt 'vas, if a valid conveyance \Vas even intended, to 
describe a specific tract, and the addition of the acre-
age was incidental only. This is vastly different from 
a deed expressly conveying a specified number of acres 
out of a specific larger tract. It is to conveyances of this 
kind that A1nerican Jurisprudence applies the rule cited 
by appellant. The I'ule applicable to the Ho,vard deed is 
likewise referred to in the quotation from A1nerican 
Jurisprudence, in the following words: 
"In a few cases, however, conveyances have 
been held to be ineffectual and void for uncertain-
ty where the land is described merely as a frac-
tional part of a designated tract or where in 
addition to giving the acreage the deed ineffec-
tively attempts to looate specifically the lan.d 
conveyed." (16 Am. Jur. 587, n. 11) 
Far fro1n there being but a few cases so holding, 
there are innumerable such cases. Patton assembles a 
number of such cases under the rule: 
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"For instance, a conveyance of a certain num-
ber of acres or of a certain number of feet of a 
tract, without giving the location in the tract, of 
the part conveyed, is generally held void for un-
certainty." Authorities cited. Patton on Titles, 
page 219, note 125. 
The paragraph quoted by appellant from 16 Am. Jur. 
587, continues on the follo,ving page, page 588, as follow8: 
"The rule that a description of land, merely 
as a part of a tract sufficiently definite, does not 
apply, however, where the grantor intenAls to con-
vey a specific part of a tract of land precisely 
described by metes and bounds, and puts in the 
conveyance a .description of a specific tract which 
is ineffectual to convey that specific tract; in such 
cases, where the obvious intention is to convey a 
particular part of some tract definitely marked 
out, and nothing else, and a description of that 
part is insufficient, the conveyance fails alto-
gether." 
Contrary to the so-called general rule, cited by appel-
lant from 16 Am. Jur 587, but 'vhich Am. Jur. itself quali-
fies, both in a later part of the same paragraph and in the 
pocket parts, the correct rule is the statement from 117 
A.L.R. 1073, which reads as follo,vs : 
"Notwithstanding occasional statements of 
contrary ilnport the decisions as a whole clearly 
show that a deed "'"hich, being so drawn as to have 
in contemplation as the subject of conveyance a 
specific part of a tract of land presmnably owned 
by the grantor, does not attempt definitely to 
locate the part, referring to it 1nerely as so many 
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acres or other indicated quantity of land of the 
larger tract, is to say the least, ineffective as a 
legal conveyance, if not utterly void for all pur-
poses." 
C.J .S. states the rule thus : 
"A deed conveying part of a tract must con-
tain a description of the part intended to be 
conveyed so as to identify that part definitely. 
Where there is no attempt to locate the part in-
tended the deed may be construed to convey an 
undivided interest in the larger tract; but t hilS rule 
does not apply to an indefinite descripti·on of the 
specific portion intended." 26 C.J.S. Sec. 30, pg. 
649 
Actually, from an examination of the Howard deed 
it becomes obvious that he did not intend to convey 2.75 
acres out of a larger tract. The addition of the acreage 
was incidental only, and as stated in Peel v. Calais, supra, 
the addition thereof "is· not sufficient here to overcome 
the vagueness and uncertainty in other respects.'' 
Appellants reference to the ordinance in the Central 
niission Oil illustrates the extremes to which appellant 
has had to resort to find authority. Being unable to find 
a single deed which the courts have upheld 'vhere there 
'vas no call going back to the place of beginning, she final-
ly found an ordinance. But her quotation is self-defeat-
Appellants' reference to the ordinance in the Central 
ing. The reference therein to Deal v. Cooper, 94 NW 62., 
shows that an omission may be supplied where "there is 
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sufficient data furnished by the deed to supply this omis-
sion." This cannot help the Howard deed where there is 
nothing in the deed itself to help supply the omission or 
to indicate any intent to go back to the place of beginning. 
CONCLlTSION 
From the admissions of appellant, the deed which is 
before the court, and the foregoing statement of authori-
ties, the following facts app·ear: 
The decedent, L. W. Howard, ten years before 
his death, made a deed to be recorded after his 
death. Deliberately, or by accident, this deed con-
tained a description which did not purport to 
close, and which contained a fatal ambiguity. T'\YO 
years after this first deed he made another deed, 
with a correct description, covering a small part 
of the srune tract. After his death both deeds '\vere 
recorded by the '''"idow, stepmother of respond-
ents. If the defective deed is reformed by the court 
almost the '\vhole of decedents estate '\Yill go to the 
wido,v, and the children of the first marriage '\vill 
be virtually disinherited. 
From these findings of fact the follo,ving conclusions 
of law arise : 
1. There are no facts before the court indi-
cating the decedent intended to make a present 
gift of a p,re8ent interest to appellant. 
2. The deed, containing patent ambiguity 
and patent defect in not purporting to close, is 
void for uncertainty. 
3. The deed, being a testamentary disposi-
tion of estate, is not susceptible to reforn1ation in 
equity. 
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4. Even if it were possible for an equity 
court to reform the deed it would not be equitable 
to do so where the effect would be to cause in-
justice and inequity. 
5. The deed, containing nothing giving the 
key to extrinsic evidence, there was no point in 
setting the matter for trial and the District c·ourt 
properly granted Judgment on the Pleadings in 
favor of respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PERRIS S. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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